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Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics: 
Protecting Oral Complaints at the Expense of 
Workplace Complaints 
In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics,1 the Supreme Court 
considered whether an employee’s oral complaints regarding potential violations of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act was a protected activity under the Act’s anti-
retaliation provision.2 The Supreme Court held that an employee’s oral complaints 
regarding violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act was a protected activity under 
the Act’s retalition provision and employers are therefore barred from retaliating 
against an employee who orally complaints under the Act.3 However, the Court 
explicitly limited its holding to employees who orally complaint to a court or 
agency and refused to determine whether employee complaints to an employer, 
whether oral or written, are protected under the anti-retaliation provision of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.4 In so holding, the Court failed to account for the more 
informal atmosphere that is the workplace and potentially greatly hindered an 
employee’s ability to actually enjoy protection for internal complaints made to an 
employer. 
I. The Case 
A. Factual Background 
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation (Saint-Gobain) is a producer of a 
variety of high performance polymer products.5 Kevin Kasten was employed as an 
hourly employee by Saint-Gobain for a period of three years.6 Kasten worked at 
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 1. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 2. Infra Part IV. 
 3. Infra Part V.A. 
 4. Infra Part V.B. 
 5. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 619 F.Supp.2d 608, 610 (W.D. Wis. 2008). 
 6. Id. 
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Saint-Gobain’s manufacturing facility in Portage, Wisconsin and was engaged in the 
manufacturing of silicone products.7 Kasten and other Saint-Gobain employees 
engaged in manufacturing silicone products were required to wear protective gear 
while working and as part of the manufacturing process in order to prevent 
particles from damaging the silicone products.8 
 Kasten and other Saint-Gobain hourly employees were required to use a time 
clock to clock in when starting a work shift and clock out when ending a work 
shift.9 The employees’ wages were determined based on these clock times.10 
Therefore, employees were only compensated for the time period between clocking 
in to begin a shift and clocking out to end a shift.11 Saint-Gobain employees were 
required to put on their protective gear before clocking in to begin a shift.12 Upon 
ending their shift, employees were required to clock out before they were able to 
take off the protective gear that was required to be worn in the workplace.13 
 Between February and November 2006, Saint-Gobain supervisors warned 
Kasten, both orally and in writing, regarding his failure to properly swipe in and out 
on the company’s time clock.14 For each of these warnings, including the oral 
warning, Kasten was issued a written notice of disciplinary action and was required 
to sign the notice, indicating his understanding of its content.15 Kasten signed each 
notice, indicating that he understood why he was being warned.16  
Between October and December 2006, Kasten orally complained to various 
Saint-Gobain supervisors that he believed the location of the company’s time clocks 
to be unlawful.17 The crux of Kasten’s complaints to supervisors was that the 
location of the company’s time clock was unlawful because it prevented employees 
from being compensated for time they were required to spend putting on and 
taking off the protective gear that they were required to wear as part of the job.18 
Kasten also advised one of the Saint-Gobain supervisors that he was contemplating 
filing a lawsuit against the company regarding the location of the time clocks.19 
On December 6, 2006, Kasten was suspended by Saint-Gobain because he had 
violated the company’s policy regarding punching in and out of the company’s time 
 
 7. Id.  
 8. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.   granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1890 (2010). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Kasten, 619 F.Supp.2d at 611. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
Shaun O’Donnell 
Vol. 7 2012 19 
clocks for the fourth time.20 Prior to this suspension, on November 20, 2006, 
Kasten’s second written warning stated that the second written warning was the last 
step of the disciplinary process and that any further violation could possibly result 
in termination.21 In a meeting regarding the suspension, Kasten again verbally 
complained to supervisors about the legality of the time clock placement.22 At the 
same meeting, Kasten also alleged that if he were to challenge the legality of the time 
clock placement in court he would be proven correct.23 On December 11, 2006, 
Saint-Gobain’s human resources manager informed Kasten via telephone that the 
company had elected to terminate his employment.24 
B. Procedural History 
Following his termination from Saint-Gobain, Kasten brought suit against Saint-
Gobain in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.25 
Kasten claimed that Saint-Gobain failed to properly compensate him for time he 
was required to spend putting on and taking off protective gear as part of his 
employment and therefore had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).26 
Central to the issue discussed herein, Kasten also claimed that Saint-Gobain 
violated the FLSA anti-retaliation provision when it terminated his employment in 
retaliation for the verbal complaints he had made about the unlawful placement of 
the company time clocks.27 
 The district court granted summary judgment to defendant Saint-Gobain on 
the basis that Kasten failed to state a claim.28 The district court held that Kasten did 
not “file a complaint” to his employer as is required by the anti-retaliation 
provision of the statute.29 Kasten appealed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Saint-Gobain to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.30 The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Saint-
Gobain, holding that Kasten failed to state a claim because the statutory 
requirement of filing a complaint precludes protection for unwritten and wholly 
oral complaints made to an employer.31 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 619 F.Supp.2d 608, 611 (W.D. Wis. 2008). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 613. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 835 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.   granted, 130 S.Ct. 
1890 (2010). 
 31. Id. at 840. 
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 Kasten appealed the Seventh Circuit’s holding to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.32 The Supreme Court held that an employee’s oral complaints to an 
agency or court are protected activity under the FLSA anti-retaliation provision and 
remanded to the Seventh Circuit.33 
II. Background 
A. Fair Labor Standards Act 
The FLSA was enacted in 1938, during the height of the Great Depression.34 In 
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscado Local No. 123,35 the Supreme Court noted 
that, like other legislation enacted during this period, the FLSA was “remedial and 
humanitarian in purpose.”36 The main objective of the FLSA was to establish certain 
minimum labor standards for workers.37 More specifically, Congress’ professed 
purpose behind the FLSA was “to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate 
[detrimental labor conditions].”38 The FLSA addressed this purpose through 
minimum wage requirements,39 overtime payment provisions,40 and compulsory 
equal wages for men and women.41 
 Congress, in providing for the enforcement of the FLSA, instituted a system 
wherein employees make complaints and institute proceedings on their own behalf 
for rights under the statute that are denied to them by their employers.42 To operate 
effectively, this approach requires that employees be free to make complaints 
without fear of retaliation against them by their employers.43 The FLSA anti-
retaliation provision, section 215(a)(3),44 was designed to provide employees 
protection against retaliatory termination and other discriminatory actions for 
asserting their rights under the statute.45 Therefore, the protections guaranteed by 
the anti-retaliation provision are designed to foster employee participation in 
implementing the FLSA.46 
 
 
 32. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325, 1329–30 (2011). 
 33. Id. at 1336. 
 34. 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (2006). 
 35. 321 U.S. 590 (1944), superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2000), as recognized 
in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 26 (2005). 
 36. Id. at 597. 
 37. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (2006). 
 39. See id. 206. 
 40. See id. 207.  
 41. See id. 206(d). 
 42. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292. 
 43. Id.  
 44. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
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 The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA provides that:  
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person...to discharge or in any other manner 
discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any 
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or 
related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such 
proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee[.]47 
An employee bringing a retaliation claim under this provision must make a 
prima facie showing that: (1) the employee was engaged in a protected activity 
under the statute; (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and, 
(3) the existence of a causal link between the employee’s participation in the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action suffered from the employer.48 
Among the protected activities under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA is 
“fil[ing] any complaint[.]”49 An employee can engage in this protected activity by 
filing a formal complaint with a government agency or in a court.50 Prior circuit 
decisions have also held that employees engaged in the protected activity of filing 
any complaint when, among other actions, they protested to a supervisor regarding 
unequal pay,51 submitted a letter to a supervisor asserting their statutory right to 
overtime pay,52 or complained of unlawful sex discrimination and alleged that the 
employer is “breaking some sort of law[.]”53  
If an employee satisfies the prima facie elements, the employer must then show a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.54 The Supreme Court, 
in a prior decision, echoed the remedial nature of the statute and directed that the 
statute not be subject to “narrow, grudging” interpretations and applications.55 
B. Approach of the Circuit Courts 
The circuit courts, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kasten, addressed the 
protections afforded by the FLSA anti-retaliation provision to employees who file 
complaints have reached different conclusions when addressing whether an 
employee who complains to an employer is protected under the FLSA.56 The main 
 
 47. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
 48. See, e.g., Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 624 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
 50. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 51. Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562–63 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 52. Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 53. EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989–90 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 54. Hagan, 529 F.3d at 624.  
 55. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscado Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944), superseded by 
statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2000), as recognized in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 26 
(2005). 
 56. Infra Part III.B.2. 
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point of divergence between the circuits was whether an employee who made an 
oral complaint to his or her employer has “filed any complaint” under section 
215(a)(3).57 
1. Complaints to Employer Not Protected Activity 
The Second and Fourth Circuits took the most restrictive approach to this issue, 
holding that the FLSA protected activities did not include employees making 
informal complaints to employers.58 In Lambert v. Genesee Hospital,59 the Second 
Circuit contrasted the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA with the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII.60 According to the Second Circuit, Title VII61 
provides protection to employees who orally complain because the statute’s 
language is broader than the FLSA, granting protection to employees who 
“oppose[] any practice” by an employer that is unlawful under Title VII.62 In 
contrast, the Second Circuit held that the FLSA is more restrictive in its language, 
restricting protection to employees who file formal complaints with administrative 
agencies or courts, institute proceedings, or testify before a court or agency.63 
 In Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co.,64 the Fourth Circuit argued that the statutory 
language of the FLSA limits the range of retaliatory action proscribed by the anti-
retaliation provision.65 The court, addressing employee testimony, noted that 
Congress’ use of the language “instituted” in regard to instituting a cause of action 
indicated that Congress intended to limit FLSA proscribed activity to retaliatory 
employment actions against employees after the commencement of formal 
proceedings.66 Therefore, the court held that employees who made complaints to 
employers about violations of the FLSA did not engage in protected activity under 




 57. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
 58. See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that protected activity consists of 
filing a complaint, instituting a proceeding or testifying, but does not include complaints made to an employer); 
Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364–65 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that employees must take 
some formal action, such as filing a complaint or instituting a proceeding  with a court or administrative body, 
to be protected activity.) 
 59. 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 60. Id. at 55. 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 62. Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55 (internal quotations omitted). 
 63. Id.   
 64. 228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 65. Id. at 364–65. 
 66. Id. at 364 (internal quotations omitted). 
 67. Id. at 365. 
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2. Employee Complaint to Employer May Be Protected Activity 
The majority of the circuits that addressed this issue provided protection under the 
FLSA for employees who had informally complained to an employer.68 The First 
Circuit, in Valerio v. Putnam Assocs.,69 reasoned that the “animating spirit” of the 
FLSA is best served when employees are afforded the same protection when filing a 
relevant complaint with an employer as well as with a court or agency.70 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, in Lambert v. Ackerley,71 noted that the Supreme 
Court’s admonition of narrow interpretations of the FLSA coupled with the 
intended incentive to employees to report violations of the FLSA requires a broad 
construction of the anti-retaliation provision.72  
 Despite the majority approach that informal complaints to employers were 
protected activity under the FLSA, these circuits differed on when an informal 
complaint to an employer was actually a protected activity. The First Circuit held 
that an informal complaint to an employer is a protected activity when the 
complaint is submitted in writing.73 Other circuits found that informal complaints 
communicated to an employer orally and then submitted in writing were protected 
activity.74 Several circuits found that an oral complaint to an employer was 
protected activity when the complaint alleged some unlawful activity by the 
employer.75 Some circuits also required that, to make a valid complaint under the 
FLSA, an employee must have stepped out of his or her role of employment in 
making the complaint.76  
i. Written Complaint to Employer Protected Activity 
The First Circuit, in Valerio v. Putnam Assocs.,77 held that an employee’s written 
complaint to an employer regarding the employer’s failure to properly compensate 
for overtime hours worked was a protected activity under the FLSA anti-retaliation 
 
 68. See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (employee’s written complaint to 
employer regarding lack of overtime compensation a protected activity); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 
1004–5 (9th Cir. 1999) (employee’s oral assertion that employer not properly compensating for overtime 
followed by attorney letter a protected activity); Grey v. City of Oak Grove, Mo., 396 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 
2005) (employee’s request for overtime compensation followed by attorney letter a protected activity); EEOC v. 
White & Sons Enterprises, 881 F.2d 1006, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 1999) (verbal assertions of unequal pay protected 
activity); EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989–90 (6th Cir. 1992) (oral complaint of 
unlawful sex discrimination a protected activity); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 
1975) (employee’s outburst in workplace and refusal to go along with unlawful scheme a protected activity). 
 69. 173 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 70. Id. at 43. 
 71. 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 72. Id. at 1003–4. 
 73. Infra Part III.B.2.i. 
 74. Infra Part III.B.2.ii. 
 75. Infra Part III.B.2.iii. 
 76. Infra Part III.B.2.iv. 
 77. 173 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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provision.78 In Valerio, the employee submitted a written complaint to her employer 
asserting that the position of receptionist is covered under the FLSA and that if the 
employer continued to insist that the employee perform receptionist duties she 
would be entitled to overtime pay under the statute.79 In the same complaint, the 
employee informed the employer that she had contacted the Department of Labor, 
was considering filing a complaint, and that it was a violation of the FLSA to fire or 
discriminate against an employee for filing a complaint or participating in a 
proceeding under the FLSA.80 
 The First Circuit held that the animating spirit of the FLSA is best realized by 
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision to protect those employees who file a 
relevant complaint with a court or agency as well as those who file a complaint with 
an employer.81 The court reasoned that, because Congress used the term “any” and 
did not specify that a complaint must be submitted to a court or agency, the anti-
retaliation provision could “relate to less formal expressions of protest, censure, 
resentment, or injustice conveyed to an employer.”82 The court also reasoned that 
Congress’ use of the term “filed” in the anti-retaliation provision, while adding a 
degree of formality, could be interpreted to include internal complaints that are 
made to an employer with the expectation that the employer will store the 
complaint in the employer’s records.83 The court went on to state that “not all 
abstract grumblings will suffice to constitute the filing of a complaint[.]”84  
 In the case below, the Seventh Circuit held that an employee’s intracompany 
complaint is protected when written but not when presented orally. In approaching 
the issue, the Seventh Circuit engaged in a two-part analysis.85 First, the court 
addressed whether internal complaints to an employer are protected activity under 
the FLSA.86 The court held that the statutory language of the anti-retaliation 
provision indicated that internal complaints to employers are protected activity.87 
The court agreed with Kasten, in that that statute does not place a limit on the types 
of complaints that are subject to protection and the word “complaint” is modified 
with “any” indicating that internal complaints to an employer are protected.88 The 
court also found that a majority of the circuit courts to address this issue have also 
found internal complaints to employers to be protected.89 
 
 78. Id. at 44. 
 79. Id. at 38. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 43. 
 82. Id. at 41. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 44. 
 85. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perf. Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. 
Ct. 1890 (2010). 
 86. Id. at 837. 
 87. Id. at 838. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
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 The court next addressed whether unwritten, wholly oral complaints are 
protected activity under the anti-retaliation provision.90 The court again started 
with a plain meaning analysis of the statutory language.91 The court agreed with the 
district court’s holding that the statutory requirement of a “filed” complaint 
necessarily precluded oral complaints to supervisors from protection.92 After 
addressing various dictionary entries, the court held that the verb “to file” requires a 
submission of a complaint in some form of writing to either an employer or some 
administrative agency.93 
 The court then examined the decisions of other circuit courts.94 The court 
highlighted the Fourth and Second Circuit decisions that held that verbal 
complaints to employers are not protected activity.95 The court then examined the 
various circuits whose holdings indicate that oral complaints to an employer are 
protected.96 The court sought to undermine these decisions as not providing 
adequate guidance on the issue because the majority of the cases do not specifically 
hold that oral complaints as a class are protected activity and the cases do not 
engage in a discussion of whether the verb “to file” requires a complaint to be in 
writing.97  
The court then declared that despite contrary holdings by other circuits, its 
holding that a complaint must be in writing to be protected activity is correct due to 
Congress’ failure to use broader language than “file any complaint.”98 The court 
noted that Congress did not use broader language in the FLSA despite having an 
opportunity as drafter to do so.99 The court then contrasted the language of the 
FLSA with the broad language of the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which forbid retaliation against any 
employee who “has opposed any practice” that is unlawful under the statutes.100 The 
court determined that Congress’ use of narrower language in the FLSA was 
significant and indicated that claims of retaliation under the FLSA were therefore 
more circumscribed than other retaliation claims.101 The court finally determined 
that, despite the remedial nature of the FLSA that requires a broad interpretation 
and application of its provisions, a broad interpretation cannot justify reading 
words into a statute, which the court believed it would be doing by finding that oral 
complaints are protected.102 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 839. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 839–40. 
 95. Id. at 839. 
 96. Id. at 839–40. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 40 (internal quotations omitted). 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
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ii. Oral Complaint to Employer Accompanied with Written Complaint Protected 
Activity 
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have both held that an employee engaged in 
protected activity when the employee orally complained to an employer then 
followed up the oral complaint with a written complaint.103 In Lambert v. Ackerley,104 
an employee, after consulting with the Department of Labor, orally asserted 
concerns to her employer that she and her coworkers were not being properly 
compensated for overtime hours.105 The employee’s lawyer then submitted a written 
letter to the employer regarding the overtime issue.106 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the employee’s complaint to her employer and subsequent letter submitted by her 
attorney was protected activity under the FLSA.107  
The Ninth Circuit stated that in order to realize the purpose of the FLSA anti-
retaliation provision, encouraging employees to report violations by employers, the 
protected activity of filing a complaint must protect employees who complain to 
their employers about violations as well as those who turn to the Department of 
Labor or courts.108 The court interpreted the anti-retaliation provision’s use of the 
language “any complaint” to include complaints made to an employer.109 The court 
also noted that the statutory language “filed” encompasses employees who file 
complaints with employers.110 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the Second Circuit 
argument that the broader language of the Title VII anti-retaliation provision 
should dictate the interpretation of the FLSA anti-retaliation provision.111 As the 
Ninth Circuit noted, Title VII was drafted in 1964, nearly 30 years before the FLSA 
was drafted in 1937, and language used in legislation drafted nearly 30 years apart 
cannot be considered persuasive in determining the meaning of language in each.112 
 The Ninth Circuit’s holding that an employee who orally complained about 
an employer’s failure to compensate for overtime and followed that complaint up 
with a letter engaged in protected activity was echoed by the Eighth Circuit. In Grey 
v. City of Oak Grove, Mo.,113 an employee requested overtime compensation from 
his employer for work performed at home.114 After the employer denied the request, 
the employee’s lawyer submitted a letter to the employer regarding the overtime 
 
 103. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999); Grey v. City of Oak Grove, Mo., 396 F.3d 
1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 104. 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 105. Id. at 1001–2. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 1005. 
 108. Id. at 1004. 
 109. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 110. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 111. Id. at 1005. 
 112. Id.  
 113. 396 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 114. Id. at 1032. 
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claim.115 The Eighth Circuit held that the employee’s claim for overtime 
compensation to the employer was protected activity under the FLSA.116  
iii. Oral Complaint to Employer Protected Activity 
Several circuit courts that have held that informal complaints to employers are 
protected activity have also held that oral complaints to an employer are protected 
activity.117 These circuits have not held that every oral complaint is protected 
activity. Rather, to be protected activity, a complaint must concern some violation 
of the FLSA.118  
 The Eleventh Circuit, in EEOC v. White & Sons Enterprises,119 held that 
employees’ verbal assertions of unequal pay, although not an act expressly included 
in the FLSA anti-retaliation provision, were protected under the anti-retaliation 
provision because they were assertions of rights that were protected under the 
FLSA.120 In EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools,121 the Sixth Circuit held that an 
employee engaged in protected activity when the employee verbally complained to 
her employer of “unlawful sex discrimination” and asserted her belief that the 
employer was “breaking some sort of law” by paying her lower wages than previous 
male counterparts.122 The Eighth Circuit, in Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha,123 also 
found an oral complaint to an employer sufficient to constitute a protected activity 
under the FLSA where the employee had an outburst in the workplace after she 
refused to take part in what she believed to be an unlawful scheme.124 
iv. Employee Must Step Outside of His or Her Employment Role in Making an 
Informal Complaint to an Employer 
Several of the circuits that have provided protection for informal complaints to 
employers have held that, to be protected under the FLSA, an employer must step 
outside of her or her employment role and assert an FLSA statutory right that is 
adverse to the employer.125 The Fifth Circuit, in Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C.,126 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1035. 
 117. See EEOC v. White & Sons Enterprises, 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1999) (verbal assertions of 
unequal pay protected activity); EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989–90 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(oral complaint of unlawful sex discrimination a protected activity); Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, 513 F.2d 179, 
183 (8th Cir. 1975) (employee’s outburst in workplace and refusal to go along with unlawful scheme a protected 
activity). 
 118. Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 119. 881 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 120. Id. at 1011. 
 121. 976 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 122. Id. at 989. 
 123. 513 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 124. Id. at 181. 
 125. Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 629–30 (5th Cir. 2008) (employee’s alerting of 
employer of potential unlawful payment practices not protected because employee a manager and performing 
job duties); Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickson Caribe, Ltd., 375 F.3d 99, 103 (1st Cir. 2004) (employee not 
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held that, in order for informal complaints to be protected activity under the FLSA 
anti-retaliation provision, an employee must act outside of his or her role with the 
company “by either filing (or threatening to file) an action adverse to the employer, 
by actively assisting other employees in asserting FLSA rights, or by otherwise 
engaging in activities that reasonably could be perceived as directed towards the 
assertion of rights protected by the FLSA.” 127 The Fifth Circuit noted that this rule is 
best suited for management employees who are charged with addressing the 
concerns of both employees and the employer.128 The court reasoned that if 
managers were not required to step outside their everyday duties of addressing the 
concerns of employees and alerting employers to potential unlawful practices nearly 
every action of a manager could be viewed as a protected activity.129 
 In Hagan, the Fifth Circuit held that an employee, a manager, did not engage 
in protected activity under the FLSA by informing employees that a schedule 
change would reduce their overtime hours.130 The manager was instructed by the 
employer to present the schedule change to employees and inform them that the 
change was due to customer satisfaction concerns. However, when asked by the 
employees, the manager informed them that the change would also reduce overtime 
hours. The court held that this was not a protected activity because the employee 
was not asserting an FLSA violation and therefore was not acting outside of his 
employment role and adverse to the employer.131 
 The First Circuit, in Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickson Caribe, Ltd.,132 also 
applied this standard in determining that an employee did not engage in protected 
activity where the employee simply reported to his employer that certain employees 
were not being properly compensated for overtime hours worked.133 The First 
Circuit reasoned that the employee was simply performing the duties of his job as 
manager in bringing the concern to light.134 The First Circuit noted that the 
hallmark of protected activity under the FLSA anti-retaliation provision is asserting 
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III. The Court’s Reasoning 
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, noted that Saint-Gobain had argued in the 
Seventh Circuit and lower courts that the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA 
should be read to cover only complaints filed to the government, not to private 
employers.136 The Court noted that the lower courts all held to the contrary, that the 
anti-retaliation provision protects complaints made by employees to the 
government as well as private employers.137 However, Saint-Gobain failed to argue 
this point in its response to Kasten’s petition for certiorari and did not bring the 
argument to light to the Court until filing its brief on the merits.138 Justice Breyer 
noted that the Court does not usually consider a separate legal question not raised 
in the parties’ certiorari briefs and that resolution of the oral or written complaint 
issue presented in the case could be reached independent of determining whether 
the FLSA anti-retaliation provision covered employees who complained to an 
employer rather than the government.139 Therefore, the Court proceeded on the sole 
question of whether “an oral complaint of a violation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act is protected conduct under the [Act’s] retaliation provision.”140 
 The Court noted that the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA provides 
protection to employees who have “filed any complaint”141 and that interpretation 
of that phrase was dependant upon “reading the whole statutory text, considering 
the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities 
that inform the analysis[.]”142 The Court began its interpretation of the phrase “filed 
any complaint” by analyzing the text of the statute.143  
The Court first endeavored to determine the meaning of the word “filed.”144 In 
determining the meaning of the term “filed,” the Court examined dictionary 
definitions, legislative and administrative usage, as well as judicial usage of the 
term.145 The Court noted that dictionary definitions of the word “filed” were 
inconclusive due to varying definitions, some of which indicate a writing while 
other definitions contemplate uses of the word that would allow oral material to be 
filed.146 The Court found that legislators, administrators, and judges have all used 
the word “filed” in the context of oral statements.147 The effect being that various 
state statutes provide for oral filings and oral complaints may be filed pursuant to 
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certain regulations promulgated by various federal agencies.148 The Court also 
examined judicial usage of the term “filed” and found that oral filings were a known 
mechanism at the time Congress drafted the anti-retaliation provision of the 
FLSA.149 
The Court conceded that filings, by their nature, are most likely to be 
accomplished in a writing.150 However, the Court noted that the entirety of the 
phrase, “filed any complaint,” specifically the use of the term “any,” operated to 
indicate that the phrase should be interpreted broadly to include oral complaints.151 
Despite the broad interpretation, the Court noted that the phrase itself did not 
provide a strong enough indication to reach a conclusion as to how the phrase 
should be interpreted.152 
Finally, the Court sought to interpret the term “filed” by looking to contextual 
indications from other appearances of the term in the FLSA as well as other statutes 
that contain anti-retaliation provisions.153 The Court noted that the term “filed” or 
its variations appeared in numerous other provisions of the FLSA but none of these 
appearances operated to resolve the interpretive issue presented by the phrase “filed 
any complaint” as found in the anti-retaliation provision.154 These other 
appearances involve filings that are either always in the form of a writing, 
specifically require a writing, or, like the anti-retaliation provision, do not indicate 
whether filings must be in the form of a writing or can be done orally.155 Similarly, 
the Court’s examination of language found in anti-retaliation provisions of other 
statutes did not provide conclusive evidence as to the intent of Congress in drafting 
the particular anti-retaliation provision found in the FLSA.156 The Court concluded 
that the text of the antiretalition provision, taken alone, could not be interpreted to 
provide a definitive answer as to whether or not oral complaints were protected and 
therefore further analysis was required.157  
After the textual analysis, the Court sought evidence, independent of the 
language of the text, suggestive of Congress’ intent in drafting the anti-retaliation 
provision.158 The Court highlighted several functional considerations that suggested 
Congress, when drafting the FLSA, intended the anti-retaliation provision to cover 
both oral and written complaints.159 First, the Court reasoned that Congress’ basic 
 
 148. Id. at 1331–32 (citations omitted). 
 149. Id. at 1332 (citations ommitted). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (citing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218, 
226 (1994)). 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. at 1332–33. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 1333. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
Shaun O’Donnell 
Vol. 7 2012 31 
objectives in drafting the FLSA requires the anti-retaliation provision to be 
interpreted to protect oral as well as written complaints.160 In drafting the FLSA, 
Congress sought to establish, among others, substantive wage, hour, and overtime 
standards to eradicate poor working conditions that negatively impacted the 
standard of living of workers.161 Enforcement of these standards is contingent upon 
“information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights 
claimed to have been denied.”162 The anti-retaliation provision was designed to 
ensure the effectiveness of this enforcement scheme by preventing employers from 
using the threat of economic retaliation to silence employees who may potentially 
complain.163 The Court reasoned that reading the anti-retaliation provision to 
protect only complaints made in writing would undermine Congress’s enforcement 
mechanism because such a construction would have failed to protect those illiterate 
and uneducated workers that would be effectively unable to make a complaint in 
writing form.164 According to the Court, these were the employees that the FLSA was 
especially meant to protect and such a result was incongruous with Congress’s 
intent in providing protections to emplyees under the FLSA.165 
Following this determination, the Court also noted that limiting the protections 
of the anti-retaliation provision to employees who complain in writing would limit 
needed flexibility for those entities responsible for enforcing the FLSA.166 The Court 
noted that such an approach could potentially limit Government agencies’ abilities 
to learn of employer violations through the use of “hotlines, interviews, and other 
oral methods of receiving complaints.”167 Additionally, the Court noted that a 
restriction of the anti-retaliation provision to complaints made in writing would 
discourage the use of informal grievance procedures by employers taking 
complaints of employees.168 However, the Court was clear in noting that it would 
not determine whether the anti-retaliation provision protects employees who make 
complaints to their employer.169 
After the textual analysis, the Court looked to the interpretations of the anti-
retaliation provision promulgated by federal agencies charged with enforcing the 
FLSA.170 The Court noted that because Congress delegated the powers of 
enforcement of the FLSA to federal agencies their interpretation of the anti-
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retaliation provision was persuasive on the issue.171 These agencies have consistently 
considered complaints to be filed when presented orally or in writing.172 
Finally, the Court noted that the FLSA requires fair notice to employers. The 
Court noted that although the textual analysis did not clearly distinguish between 
writings and oral statements, the evidence examined suggested that a “filing” is a 
serious occasion and not a triviality.173 Therefore, “filed any complaint” necessarily 
involves “some degree of formality, certainly to the point where the recipient has 
been given fair notice that a grievance has been lodged and does, or should, 
reasonably understand the matter as part of its business concerns.”174 
The Court held that the Seventh Circuit’s determination that oral complaints 
cannot fit the phrase “filed any complaint” in the anti-retaliation provision was 
incorrect.175 Rather, oral complaints can be protected under the anti-retaliation 
provision.176 To be protected, a complaint, whether oral or in writing, “must be 
sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of 
both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call 
for their protection.”177 
Justice Scalia dissented and was joined by Justice Thomas in all but footnote 6.178 
The dissent argued that the anti-retaliation provision does not cover complaints 
made to employers and therefore the judgment of the Seventh Circuit should be 
affirmed.179 According to Justice Scalia, the plain meaning of the anti-retaliation 
provision as well as the context in which it appears operates to require that an 
employee file an official grievance with a court or an agency to be protected from 
employer retaliation.180 Rather than focus on the word “filed,” the dissent reached 
this conclusion by examining the word “complaint,” its meaning at the time the 
FLSA was passed, as well as its meaning derived from the other words in the phrase 
“filed any complaint.”181  
IV. Analysis 
In Kasten, the Supreme Court correctly held that an employee’s oral complaints are 
protected activity under the FLSA anti-retaliation provision. However, the Court 
failed to ensure adequate protections to complaining employees by explicitly 
refusing to determine the scope of protection under the retalition provision to 
employees who complain of FLSA violations directly to an employer, whether in 
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writing or orally. The Court should have reached a definitive holding on the issue, 
providing that employee complaints to employers may be protected, whether orally 
or in writing, on the basis of a case-by-case factual analysis. 
A. Court’s Holding Results in Less Protections for Employees 
The Supreme Court, in holding that oral complaints are protected as filing any 
complaint under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, was consistent with its 
prior observations regarding the FLSA. Prior to its decision in Kasten, the Court 
stipulated that the FLSA is remedial in nature and the statute should therefore be 
interpreted broadly.182 Additionally, as the Court noted in Kasten, the purpose of the 
FLSA is to provide an incentive to employees to report wage and hour violations by 
employers.183 
 In the case below, the Seventh Circuit barred all oral complaints from 
protection under the FLSA184 and thereby undermined the remedial purpose of the 
FLSA by interpreting the statute in a narrow manner. As the Supreme Court 
pointed out, definitions of the term “filed” are not conclusive as to whether a 
complaint can be “filed” by being made orally.185 Some dictionary definitions 
require a filing to be made in writing while others seemingly allow for oral filings.186 
The broad dictionary definitions coupled with the Court’s prior holdings that the 
FLSA is remedial in purpose and be interpreted broadly, the Congressional 
intentions in drafting the FLSA, and the approaches of agencies charged with 
enforcing the FLSA operate to provide strong evidence that complaints can be filed 
orally under the anti-retaliation provision.187 
Although the Court correctly determined that the FLSA anti-retaliation 
provision protects oral complaints, it failed to fully recognize the remedial purpose 
of the FLSA and ensure that the act was broadly interpreted to provide an incentive 
to employees to report wage and hour violations by employers. The Court, citing 
Saint-Gobain’s failure to properly argue the point, did not address the issue of 
whether an employee complaint to an employer regarding potential violations of 
the FLSA is protected activity.188 The Court’s failure to address this point presents an 
important restriction on the protections provided to employees under the anti-
retaliation provision and operates to restrict incentives to employees to report 
potential FLSA violations by employers, the core enforcement technique of the 
FLSA. 
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 The Court’s failure to address employee complaints to employers jeopardizes 
protections for complaining employees that were in place in several circuits before 
the Court’s holding in Kasten.189 Of the circuits that addressed the scope of the 
FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, only the Second Circuit held that an employee 
was not protected under the anti-retaliation provision for any complaint made to 
an employer, whether in writing or oral.190 Before Kasten, the majority of the circuits 
that addressed this issue held that an employee’s complaint to an employer may be 
protected under the anti-retaliation provision.191 The majority of the circuits that 
determined an employee’s complaint to an employer may be protected under the 
anti-retaliation provision engaged in a factual analysis of the complaint at issue to 
determine whether the complaint was subject to protection under the FLSA.192 The 
circuits that engaged in this type of analysis did not hold that an internal complaint 
is not protected solely because it was not submitted to an employer in writing.193 
Rather, the question of whether a complaint was protected turned on the content of 
the complaint. 
 Internal complaints to an employer had been found to be protected activity 
when the complaint concerned some violation of the FLSA,194 and when the 
complaining employee stepped out of his or her employment role in making the 
complaint.195 Additionally, although a complaint was required to concern a 
violation of the FLSA, an employee did not need to specifically cite the FLSA when 
asserting a violation by an employer. Oral complaints had been found to satisfy this 
standard when an employee verbally asserted an objection to unequal pay,196 told an 
employer she believed the employer to be engaging in “unlawful sex 
discrimination” and “breaking some sort of law[,]”197 and had an outburst in the 
workplace and refused to take part in a scheme the employee believed to be 
unlawful.198 
 The facts of Kasten illustrate a set of circumstances that would have been 
found to be a valid FLSA complaint under this approach. Kasten, in his various 
complaints to supervisors, complained that he believed the location of the 
company’s time clocks was unlawful because it caused employees to not be properly 
compensated.199 He also advised supervisors that he was contemplating filing a 
lawsuit against the employer due to the location of the time clocks.200 In making the 
complaint, Kasten was also acting outside of his employment role. Kasten was 
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employed as a manufacturer and did not have any human resources or 
management duties.201 Kasten clearly asserted his belief that the employer was acting 
unlawfully due to the location of the time clocks. Kasten’s assertion of unlawful 
activity was similar to those complaints found to be protected activity by other 
circuits in that Kasten orally complained to his employer about activity that he 
believed to be unlawful. 
 However, the Court’s failure to address whether an employee’s complaint to 
an employer is protected under the anti-retaliation provision potentially opens the 
door to all employee complaints to employers regarding FLSA violations not being 
protected. The Court’s failure to address whether complaining to an employer is a 
protected activity has already resulted in lower courts restricting protections 
available to complaining employees under the FLSA. The United States District 
Court for the Western District Court of New York, in Son v. Reina Bijoux,202 recently 
held that the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA does not protect an employee 
who complains of FLSA violations to an employer, orally or in writing, and 
subsequently suffers an adverse employment action by the employer.203 In Son, the 
employee complained to her employers during several meetings regarding the 
employers’ failure to compensate her for overtime hours that she was required to 
work.204 During the last meeting, the employers terminated Son’s employment.205 
In reaching this decision, the court interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Kasten,206noting that the Supreme Court specifically avoided the issue of whether an 
employee who complains to an employer, orally or in writing, is protected under 
the anti-retaliation provision.207 Rather, as the district court noted, the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Kasten merely established that an employee who complains, 
orally or in writing, to a government agency is protected from employer 
retaliation.208 Therefore, the district court reasoned that it was free to apply existing 
Second Circuit precedent regarding employee complaints to employers.209 The 
Second Circuit, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kasten, was the only 
circuit to specifically hold that employee complaints to employers are not protected 
activity under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA.210 Therefore, the district 
court was not required to engage in any analysis to determine whether Son’s 
complaint to her employer was a protected activity beyond determining that Son 
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did in fact complain to her employers and consequently was not entitled to anti-
retaliation protection under the FLSA.211 
However, the Fourth Circuit has taken the opposite approach. In Minor v. 
Bostwick Laboratories,212 the Fourth Circuit held that an employee’s oral complaint 
to an employer regarding potential FLSA violations was protected activity under the 
FLSA.213 In that case, an employee met with the CEO of the company that employed 
her to voice concerns that the employee’s direct supervisor was acting in direct 
violation of the FLSA.214 Less than a week after the meeting, the CEO terminated the 
employee.215  
The Fourth Circuit, noting that the issue of whether an employee who lodges a 
complaint regarding FLSA violations with an employer is protected under the FLSA 
anti-retaliation provision was a matter of first impression for the circuit, looked to 
the Supreme Court for guidance.216 Although the Fourth Circuit had previously 
indicated, in Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q,217 that complaints to employers were not a 
protected activity, the Fourth Circuit noted that its decision in that case only 
concerned the protections for employees who testify pursuant to an FLSA claim and 
did not specifically determine whether an employee who lodges a complaint with an 
employer is protected.218  
In determining whether complaints to employers are protected, the Fourth 
Circuit noted that Kasten was not controlling because the Supreme Court had failed 
to determine whether an employee who complained to an employer was protected 
under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA.219 Instead, the Fourth Circuit used 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kasten as persuasive and proceeded to address 
the issue as a matter of first impression.220 The Fourth Circuit held that the 
ambiguity in the plain meaning of the language of the provision, remedial nature of 
the FLSA, and agency interpretations of the anti-retaliation clause operate to 
require that intracompany complaints by employees, oral or in writing, be 
protected under the anti-retaliation provision.221 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit 
echoed the Supreme Court in Kasten, noting that the an employer must effectively 
be put on notice that an employee is making a complaint meaning that a filing must 
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be accompanied by some degree of formality.222 Therefore, not every instance of an 
employee simply “blowing off steam” will be considered a protected activity.223 
The division between these two subsequent decisions is illustrative of the Court’s 
failure in Kasten in that its holding potentially allows lower courts to avoid any 
analysis of whether an employee suffered retaliation for a complaint regarding FLSA 
violations where the employee complained to an employer. The Court’s decision to 
not address the issue of whether intracompany complaints are protected results in 
the division among circuits regarding intracompany complaints to remain virtually 
unchanged except that circuits that hold intracompany complaints to be protected 
now must hold that such complaints made orally are also protected. Therefore, as 
illustrated in Son, courts are free to continue to hold that intracompany complaints 
are not protected. Additionally, circuits are arguably free to determine, while Kasten 
extended FLSA protection to oral complaints to government agencies or courts, not 
to extend those protections to intracompany complaints. 
By denying protection to a category of complaints the Supreme Court failed to 
provide complete protection to employees and account for the informal 
atmosphere of the workplace. In the workplace, an employee can voice a concern 
directly to an employer regarding the employer’s unlawful activity and immediately 
draw attention from the employer. Conversely, complaints made to administrative 
agencies or courts usually will not be known to an employer until after they have 
been formally filed.  
By not granting protection to an employee who voices concerns to an employer, 
the Supreme Court jeopardizes the FLSA purpose of providing incentives to 
employees to report unlawful activity by employers. Unwitting employees who are 
not aware that they must submit any complaint regarding unlawful activity to an 
employer could be subject to termination before they are able to file a formal 
complaint. This problem is exacerbated by the common policies of employers that 
encourage open, verbal communication of ideas and concerns between employees 
and managers.224 Employees voicing concerns about unlawful employment practices 
in this setting are not guaranteed protection from retaliation by the employer under 
the Court’s holding in Kasten. 
B. Proposed Inquiry for Determining Protected Activity 
In order to fully realize the purpose of the FLSA anti-retaliation provision, the 
Supreme Court should have addressed the intracompany complaint issue and 
developed a standard for when intracompany complaints, oral or in writing, are 
protected. The Court should have engaged in a case-by-case factual analysis of the 
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content of a complaint. Such a case-by-case was employed by the circuits before 
Kasten. Under that analysis, to be protected activity, an employee’s complaint 
should allege unlawful activity on the part of the employer225 and the employee must 
step out of his or her employment role in making the complaint.226 Additionally, an 
employee’s complaint must be substantial enough to rise above the level of an 
“abstract grumbling[]” or vague expression of discontent.227 
 A potential standard for determining whether an employee’s oral complaint to 
an employer could arise to protected activity under the FLSA can be found from 
jurisprudence of prior circuit court decisions. The various circuits that had found 
oral complaints to be protected activity under the FLSA did not expressly hold that 
all oral complaints are protected activity.228 The key factor in those cases was 
whether the complaining employee, in making a complaint to an employer, alleged 
that the employer was engaging in an activity that the employee believed to be 
unlawful.229 The complaining employee was also required to step out of his or her 
employment role and make a complaint that was adverse to the employer.230 These 
standards should be considered in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s 
established standard that to be protected, a complaint, whether oral or in writing, 
“must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, 
in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the 
statute and a call for their protection.”231 
 Applying this analysis to the facts of Kasten, it would be clear that the 
employee engaged in protected activity by complaining to his employer about the 
illegality of the company time clock location.232 Kasten did not put forth an 
“abstract grumbling” or a vague expression of discontent regarding the location of 
the time clocks. Kasten repeated this allegation several times over a period of 
months, in accordance with the company’s internal complaint mechanism, and 
advised the employer that he was contemplating filing a lawsuit against the 
employer regarding the issue.233  
 This case-by-case factual analysis presents several important considerations. A 
positive holding that intracompany complaints are protected, in addition to the 
Court’s holding that oral complaints are protected, will subject employers to an 
increased burden to make sure that they do not take action against an employee 
who has informally complained, orally or in writing, that may be considered 
retaliatory. However, refusing to address the issue of intracompany complaints fails 
to realize the remedial purpose of the statute and ensure that employees are free to 
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report violations as Congress intended. Such a categorical silence runs counter to 
the purpose of the FLSA and the principles set forth by the Supreme Court 
regarding application of the statute.234 
V. Conclusion 
By explicitly refusing to determine whether any employee complaints made directly 
to an employer, whether orally or in writing, are protected under the FLSA anti-
retaliation provision the Court failed to properly recognize the remedial purpose of 
the statute and potentially categorically denied protection to employees who 
complain to an employer. This holding has the effect of allowing individual circuits 
to determine whether employee complaints made directly to an employer will be a 
protected activity in that circuit. The potential result is that employers will be able 
to retaliate against any employee who makes known their objection to unlawful 
activity so long as that employee has yet to complain to a court or agency. The 
Court’s holding does not go far enough in ensuring adequate protections to 
employees under the FLSA anti-retaliation provision and will potentially 
undermine the incentive at the heart of FLSA implementation for employees to 
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